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In 1954, when Brown vs. Board of Education 
(Brown) ruled that segregation was illegal, Dallas, like most 
southern cities, was very residentially segregated and not 
eager to welcome black children into white schools as 
mandated.  The city dragged its feet far longer than others, 
and in 1961 it was the very last large school district in the 
country to allow black students to attend white schools 
(SMU Law 1).  Busing for integration was implemented 
even farther behind other cities, but white flight out of the 
school district occurred in Dallas to a greater degree than 
most other metropolitan areas.  Currently, according to the 
National Center for Education Statistics, the Dallas school 
district has the second lowest percentage of white students, 
only behind Detroit (“Status and Trends”).  There is no 
question that residential segregation in Dallas was 
happening long before segregated schools became illegal, 
leaving uncertainty about the true causes of the wholesale 
abandoning of the Dallas Independent School District 
(DISD) by whites.  Some researchers believe that the fear of 
integration doomed the process before it started, while others 
believe that the flawed implementation is responsible for its 
failure.  I believe that the racial and political atmosphere in 
Dallas at the time supports a combination of both 
explanations, as the resisted, prolonged roll-out facilitated a 
level of fear that the actual implementation could never 
overcome.          
The Brown ruling was misunderstood by many 
cities, but Dallas carried it a step further by attempting to 
ignore it.  Brown declared that state laws establishing 
separate black and white schools were unconstitutional; in 
other words, it ruled that a black child who lived closest to a 
white school could not be prohibited from attending that 
school on the basis of his/her race.  Brown did not, however, 
mandate any sort of school integration, or set any guidelines 
on what percentage of a school’s population should come 
from minority vs. majority racial groups.  Furthermore, it did 
not set a specific timeline for when states must allow black 
children to enroll in previously white schools, instead using 
the vague guidelines of “with all deliberate speed.”  Dallas 
city leaders used this leeway to introduce many legal 
roadblocks, declaring that the Brown ruling contradicted the 
Texas state constitution.  They even conducted a city-wide 
vote in 1960, and the results were unsurprisingly 4 to 1 
against school desegregation (SMU Law 1).  City leaders, 
not wanting to experience the violent and angry mobs that 
met black students attending white schools in Little Rock 
and Charlotte, were in no hurry to allow desegregation.  With 
eighteen black children enrolled in a previously white school 
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in 1961, Dallas was the largest city in the south to still have 
a segregated school system (Kiviat 1).  Even seven years 
after the ruling, many people in Dallas still preferred to 
interpret “with all deliberate speed” to mean “not in our 
lifetime” (McCorkle 2), and black children trickled into 
white schools in a less than speedy manner. 
Just as the courts were evaluating the impact of 
desegregation on the school system, city leaders were 
concerned about the impact it would have on the choices of 
middle class white residents.  White flight traditionally 
refers to the movement of white people from urban areas into 
the suburbs, often precipitated by the arrival of minority 
residents into their neighborhoods.  From a sociological 
perspective, white flight can be the result of many changing 
dynamics, from crime rates to school quality, and so 
individual cause and effect relationships are difficult to 
identify.  The Cliometric Society, an academic organization 
that studies economic theory, developed two hypotheses to 
explain why white urban residents choose to decamp to 
outlying areas.  The Pull Theory maintains that people are 
lured by the amenities that suburbs provide, including newer 
(and often larger) homes, lower taxes, and improved civic 
services.  The Push Theory, on the other hand, implies that 
movement to the suburbs is affected by the changing social 
conditions in the central cites – increased crime, racial 
unrest, deteriorating city services, and school desegregation 
(Bickford 2).  Although the arguments for the Pull Theory 
are valid and plausible, data tends to more fully support the 
Push Theory.  In Dallas, the statistics certainly show that 
white families felt the push out of the school district and took 
their students elsewhere. 
In 1969, the DISD was still 59% white, but by 
2003, it was only 7% white (McCorkle 213).  The flight from 
the school district is indisputable, yet data presents a curious 
picture of the Dallas landscape during the 1960s and 1970s 
that contributed to this.  Although black children were 
attending previously all-white schools after 1961, they were 
doing so in relatively small numbers.  DISD declared itself 
desegregated in 1967, but this was a major overstatement, as 
zones were drawn to allow segregated schools to continue 
and “a dual system still existed” (SMU Law 1).   
Desegregation did not cause major upheaval in Dallas in the 
1960s because it simply was not happening in a major way.  
The city really began to experience issues with white flight 
once schools were required to integrate via busing in the 
following decade. 
In 1966, James Coleman, a sociologist at Johns 
Hopkins University, published a study that found that black 
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children who attended integrated schools would have higher 
test scores if the majority of their classmates were white 
(Kiviat 1).  This study ignited political fervor to actively and 
aggressively integrate schools, often busing children far 
from their neighborhoods in effort to achieve more racial 
balance in the classrooms.  Even though civil rights activists 
demanded that black students had access to equal quality 
schools, they did not insist that they attend the same schools 
as whites, and many black parents were as opposed to busing 
as white parents were (Minow 10).  In Dallas, black parents 
were angry with the plan to close some of the all-black 
neighborhood schools, although they were dissatisfied with 
the quality of education the attending students were 
receiving.  An August, 1971 survey found that one-third of 
the African American parents in Dallas opposed busing, and 
those who supported it did so because they believed it was 
the only means to ensure a quality education for their 
students (McCorkle 52, 61).  Despite uncertainty from 
parents of all races, the first students in Dallas were bused 
for the 1971-72 school year, and this is when white flight in 
Dallas became such a major issue. 
There are two points of view about why white 
families removed their children from the DISD and moved 
their families to the suburbs:  the fear of school integration 
and the failure of its implementation.  Statistics do support 
fear as a valid theory, as white flight did spike when busing 
was first introduced.   Although parents feared a myriad of 
things, including scholastic degradation, increased school 
violence, and decreased property values (or a combination 
of these and others), all fears fell under the umbrella of the 
racism that was widespread in Dallas at the time.  Christine 
Rossell, a political science professor who has studied white 
flight extensively, claims that a surge in white flight is 
experienced before the opening of school in the first year and 
during the first year of desegregation, but that it levels off 
after that (Rossell 676).  Her research shows that families 
make decisions based on the fear of what might happen when 
minority students are introduced into majority white 
classrooms.  Because of this fear, “white families did not 
perceive a choice between an integrated and all-white school 
but rather between an all-white school and one that is almost 
certain to become all-black” (Rossell 689).  In other words, 
white families worry that when black children attend their 
neighborhood school, their children will suffer in some way.  
Rossell maintains that white flight is due to parents refusing 
to participate in the plan and being unwilling to wait to see 
whether the problems they anticipate actually arise.  
Rossell’s hypothesis did ring true in Dallas as a staggering 
number of white students did not show up for school in the 
fall of 1971.  By the end of the first week, white students 
who were assigned to be bused to three of the all-black high 
schools seemed to disappear.  The numbers show the extent 
of the boycott: “of 180 white students assigned to Roosevelt, 
only 21 enrolled; of 275 assigned to Lincoln, only 10 
enrolled; and of 191 assigned to Pinkston, only 34 enrolled” 
(Linden 83).  Fear clearly sent those students running from 
DISD before the first day of school. 
Not every family who left DISD moved to the 
suburbs.  Those who could afford private or parochial 
schools often chose to move their children rather than move 
the entire family.  In large school districts like Dallas, white 
parents often felt as if their voice had little impact on future 
school decisions (Farley 132), and many felt helpless to 
effect any change should they have a negative experience.  
Even some who could afford private school tuition still 
chose to move.  White families understood the relationship 
between school quality and real estate values, and they were 
reluctant to wait for their property values to fall.  Parents 
“judge the quality of a school mainly on the kind of families 
whose children are predominant in the classrooms, so when 
black children started showing up, white families attempted 
to circumvent integration by moving to school districts with 
majority white populations” (Bickford 3).  Real estate 
professionals agree that the quality of a neighborhood school 
is a top criterion in the house hunting process.  Any negative 
change in school quality will therefore have a negative 
impact on property values, and the fear of school quality 
decline was a valid one.  As reported in March of 1971, 
students at Dallas’ all-black schools were testing below 96% 
of the entire United States (McCorkle 32), while students at 
Dallas’ all-white schools were testing only slightly below 
those at Highland Park High School, which was the best 
public high school in the state.  Concern about how the influx 
of these students would dilute academic progress, along with 
fears of classroom disruption, were rampant among white 
parents prior to the start of school.  Although some argue that 
parents were masking their racism behind academic and 
safety concerns, a mass exodus was still the outcome.  Those 
who moved were unlikely to admit that they were leaving to 
avoid having their child sit next to a black child in the 
classroom, so it is difficult to determine exactly the type of 
fear that drove the departure. 
Proof also exists that white flight in Dallas was 
caused by the failure of the integration process.  The poor 
implementation of the integration/busing initiative certainly 
contributed to further abandonment of the DISD by white 
students.  White parents might have been willing to send 
their students to neighborhood schools with other black 
students, but they were clearly not willing to allow their 
students to bus across town to a predominantly black school.  
At the close of the 1971-72 school year, about 5000 students 
were being bused – only 100 of whom were white 
(McCorkle 62).  Over six thousand white students had left 
the school district, “but no one was sure where the white 
students had gone…one estimate had 40% moving to the 
suburbs of Plano, Richardson, Garland, Lewisville and 
Duncanville” (Linden 101).   No satisfactory way could be 
found to get white students to attend predominantly black 
schools (Linden 84), and the white flight continued.  The 
following four years saw similar losses, as problems with 
integration continued to frustrate both white and black 
parents.  By 1975, DISD had lost almost 28,000 white 
students, at which point they constituted only 45% of the 
students in the district (McCorkle 77). 
In addition to refusing to bus their students to 
minority schools, threats of violence and actual fighting 
caused some students to leave integrated schools.  On 
September 17, 1971, one hundred fifty white parents pulled 
their children from a Dallas junior high school based on 
threats of violence and unrest (McCorkle 62), although 
nothing actually happened.  Other schools reported that 
white students were being beaten and robbed by black 
students, and some of these accounts were true, but 
complaints were not just coming from white parents.  Black 
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parents complained that white students were getting special 
treatment and that their students were uncomfortable in 
majority white schools, both from the cultural differences 
and from exposure to affluence at levels they were ill 
accustomed.  Neither black nor white students were happy 
with the situation, but the white students often had more 
choice in where they could go.  Although not all white 
families could afford to move, “families of color faced not 
only economic hurdles in moving to prosperous 
communities with good schools but also direct 
discrimination in the mortgage and housing markets” 
(Minow 25).   While many white students fled to private 
schools or suburbs, most black students were left to ride 
buses across town to schools that had fewer and fewer white 
students with which to integrate. 
Not surprisingly, the fear-based white flight of 
year one actually contributed to the failure of integration in 
the following years.  It can be argued that the initial mass 
exodus caused the failure because of the reduced number of 
white students who were available to integrate previously 
all-black schools.  By 1981, the DISD superintendent 
admitted that it would be mathematically impossible to 
eliminate all one-race schools because there were only 
29.5% white students still left in the district (McCorkle 117).  
Integration failed, to some extent, because of the 
unwillingness of white students to participate, although little 
blame can be placed on parents who maintained that they 
were looking out for the best interests of their children.     
Exacerbating the problem of absent white students 
was the fact that test scores for those remaining did not 
improve, despite the Coleman reports’ predictions 
otherwise.  In Grades 4-6, black students who were bused to 
white schools scored beneath black students who remained 
in their neighborhood schools in reading and math, in some 
instances by as much as 18 points (McCorkle 146).  This 
demonstrated to both white and black parents that integration 
was harming students of both races, both socially and 
scholastically.  By 1982, Dallas 9th graders were scoring the 
lowest in reading and the 2nd lowest in math among the 
largest eight Texas school districts (McCorkle 146), so the 
continued movement to suburban schools could be justified 
from a quality of education perspective.   
The failure of integration caused continued worry 
about urban property values.  Upper class, high status whites 
were unwilling to live in an area with public school issues, 
regardless of whether their children attended them.  Status 
consciousness cannot be overlooked as a reason to abandon 
a neighborhood with a problem school.  “Middle class 
residents select a neighborhood based on the social status it 
conveys to the rest of society” (Bickford 3), so it is plausible 
to attribute some of the movement to the newer suburbs as 
fleeing the stigma associated with integrated schools.  The 
suburbs saw a net gain of 36,600 white students between 
1971 and 1975 (McCorkel 78), and although not all were 
coming from DISD, re-segregation in the greater Dallas area 
was happening just as fervently as integration was being 
pushed.   
Because Dallas experienced white flight in such 
large numbers, sociologists and historians explore whether 
other characteristics of the city contributed to this pattern.  In 
similar large cities throughout the south, desegregation was 
more widespread in the years before the busing initiative was 
introduced, so schools had more time to adapt to the 
changing racial enrollment.  Some maintain that the slow 
speed with which Dallas implemented simple desegregation 
accelerated the white flight, as no one had the opportunity to 
give a slower paced desegregation a chance at success.  
Another characteristic of Dallas was the abundance of other 
choices in both established and newly forming white 
suburbs.  Studies show that the greater the availability of 
largely white suburban school districts, the greater the 
percent decline in white enrollment (Farley et al 133).   In 
1965, 57% of the Dallas Standard Metropolitan Statistical 
Area (SMSA) residents lived in the city, which is a relatively 
large number for a city with so many suburban choices; to 
compare, in Dayton, Ohio, only 32% of the SMSA lived in 
the city (Blakeslee).  Cities that have a high percentage 
usually do not experience significant white flight because the 
urban area is assumed to provide sufficient neighborhood 
choices to meet the residents’ needs.  However, Highland 
Park was the only urban area not impacted by integration, 
and a high percentage of residents were priced out of that 
exclusive enclave.  “To lose public education was to lose the 
city,” (Linden 174) as Dallas certainly learned.  As tail lights 
glowed in all directions from vehicles pointed away from the 
city, Dallas was left to figure out how to resurrect a school 
district that was bleeding white students year after year.    
Dallas is also different from other cities in that it 
continued to experience white flight even as forced busing 
ended.  This contradicts the findings of several studies that 
document a reduction in white flight after the spike of the 
first year (Rossell 676).  Movement to the suburbs occurs 
even today, despite the fact that very few white students still 
attend DISD schools.  This can be attributed to the fact that 
Dallas public school quality has not kept up to the levels of 
many suburban districts, as evidenced by the disparity in 
numbers of National Merit Semi-Finalists.  In 2010, there 
were only three finalists across all 43 DISD high schools, 
two from Bishop Lynch and one from Hillcrest; Highland 
Park High School alone had 16, and the three Plano high 
schools had 86 (“National Merit”).  Poor test scores certainly 
qualify as a push factor, especially for residents of a city that 
is perpetually proving its worth and competing to be world 
class.  Parents who had the means to provide their children a 
better education clearly had options outside of DISD, and 
they took advantage of them in large numbers.   
School desegregation and integration were 
complex social issues that had far reaching effects in Dallas 
in the last half of the twentieth century.  Obviously, some 
degree of movement to the suburbs would have happened 
regardless, but “if it is impossible to measure the precise 
impact of school desegregation on white flight, it is equally 
insupportable to claim that there is no effect whatsoever” 
(Ravitch 145).  As shown, there are valid arguments for fear 
based white flight and failure based white flight, and the 
combination of both is likely a better explanation for the 
mass exodus to the suburbs.  Like many sociological trends, 
the data does not point to only one explanation, but it does 
prove that white students abandoned DISD en mass, and this 
cannot be explained away by the lure of the suburbs or the 
status consciousness of middle-class white residents.  School 
desegregation/integration did not cause white flight in Dallas 
just as its elimination did not end it.  However, the damage 
to the school system was done, and the lingering troubles 
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continue to dissuade white parents from sending their 
children to DISD schools.    
Although DISD is now considered “unitary”, 
which means that it is not legally segregated, it is still very 
much a self-segregated district.  Many believe that this is just 
fine, as it puts the students back in their neighborhood 
schools with community support.  Even James Coleman 
revised his original findings to admit that forced integration 
had caused white flight in big cities, particularly in those like 
Dallas that had several adjacent school districts that were 
majority white.  His revised 1975 report warned that policies 
going forward should not be so broad or system-wide, going 
so far as to admit that “the courts are probably the worst 
instruments of social policy” (Ravitch 135).     
Although Dallas has always been a racially and 
economically segregated city, the experience with 
integration damaged the school district in ways that were 
neither anticipated nor managed.  Interestingly, as 
emotionally devastating as busing was to Dallas citizens, no 
more than 12% of the students were ever bused for 
desegregation purposes (McCorkle 211).  The fear of the 
possibility far outweighed the actual risk, likely because 
there were not enough white students left to bus or enough 
remaining white schools to which black students could be 
bussed.  In the 1970s, white parents voted with their feet, and 
their footsteps continue to echo throughout the city.  Had 
Dallas been less reluctant to implement desegregation 
originally, perhaps mandated integration would not have 
failed as badly as it did.  While integration achieved through 
busing was never to be an effective solution anywhere, the 
makeup of DISD might look markedly different today if 
white students remained and assimilated back into their 
neighborhood schools just as the black children did.  Forced 
integration ended, but the numbers continue to preclude 
natural integration from ever getting a chance. 
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